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Abstract
A new form of digital economic circulation has emerged, wherein ideas, knowledge, labour and
use rights for otherwise idle assets move between geographically distributed but connected
and interactive online communities. Such circulation is apparent across a number of digital
economic ecologies, including social media, online marketplaces, crowdsourcing,
crowdfunding and other manifestations of the so-called ‘sharing economy’. Prevailing accounts
deploy concepts such as ‘co-production’, ‘prosumption’ and ‘peer-to-peer’ to explain digital
economic circulation as networked exchange relations characterised by their disintermediated,
collaborative and democratising qualities. Building from the neologism of platform capitalism,
we place ‘the platform' — understood as a distinct mode of socio-technical intermediary and
business arrangement that is incorporated into wider processes of capitalisation — at the
centre of the critical analysis of digital economic circulation. To create multi-sided markets and
coordinate network effects, platforms enrol users through a participatory economic culture
and mobilise code and data analytics to compose immanent infrastructures. Platform
intermediation is also nested in the ex-post construction of a replicable business model.
Prioritising rapid up-scaling and extracting revenues from circulations and associated data
trails, the model performs the structure of venture capital investment which capitalises on the
potential of platforms to realise monopoly rents.
Keywords
Digital economy, platform business model, intermediation, capitalisation, venture capital
Finance and Society
2017, 3(1): 11-31
© The Author(s)
10.2218/finsoc.v3i1.1936
Article
12 Finance and Society 3(1)
Introduction: White Label
At a small-scale academic-practitioner conference held in London in the middle of 2015
devoted to the United Kingdom’s rapidly growing crowdfunding economy, a debate took hold
about the recent proliferation of crowdfunding platforms. Discussion amongst conference
participants stressed that this economy had initially been dependent upon the emergence of
pioneering platforms that were created by the ingenuity of their founders in bringing together
financial and technological expertise. Zopa, for instance, opened for business in 2005 and
quickly emerged as a global leader in peer-to-peer (P2P) unsecured lending to household
borrowers. The first-ever equity crowdfunding platform, Crowd Cube, was launched in the UK in
2011, the same year as Abundance Generation, the first platform to arrange the issue of fixed-
interest bonds. The crux of the conference debate came to centre on how to interpret the large
number of crowdfunding platforms presently operating in the UK. Growth has been rapid and
continues apace: by 2016, over 40 platforms were members of the UK Crowdfunding
Association,1 while a further eight were members of the Peer-to-Peer Finance Association.2
The prevailing view expressed at the conference was that, although there would likely be
bankruptcies which could cause a ‘correction’ to the pace of growth, an increasing number of
platforms with relatively distinct market niches was an indicator of the continuing expansion of
the crowdfunding economy and of the UK’s position as a world leader in this sector. Albeit from
a low base, crowdfunding in the UK expanded much faster than the rest of the financial sector
in recent years. By 2015, the volume of funds raised through crowdfunding reached £3.2
billion, compared to £666 million in 2013 and £1.74 billion in 2014, an increase of over 300%
in two years. It has been estimated that crowdfunding accounted for over 3% of gross lending
to UK small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in 2015, and was responsible for the
equivalent of 14% of new bank loans to small businesses (Zhang et al., 2016).
One practitioner in the conference audience intervened in the debate, drawing attention
to White Label Crowdfunding, a company that offers an ‘off-the-shelf’ platform building tool for
would-be crowdfunding enterprises. White Label promote themselves as providers of “market-
leading technology and support”, enabling firms to “enter the alternative finance market
quickly”.3 As the examples on White Label’s website attest, the design, build and maintenance
of a crowdfunding platform is an expert service that the company has provided to a number of
new market entrants. Most are start-up firms, but Invest and Borrow, for example, is a
crowdfunding spin-off by the pay-day-lender, Wonga. By drawing attention to White Label, the
conference delegate wanted to illustrate that a crowdfunding platform could be assembled
with relative ease and at much reduced cost than was once the case. Indeed, the platforms
assembled by White Label and other similar platform builders (e.g. Sharetribe, Near Me) are
an amalgam of widely available generic plug-and-play extensions for core platform
competencies, such as electronic payments and content management, as well as bespoke
code (Choudary, 2015). The proliferation of crowdfunding platforms in the UK is, therefore, not
merely an indicator of the on-going expansion of the crowdfunding economy. Rather, it is also
constituent of the maturity and ubiquity of multi-sided platforms as enterprises and socio-
technical systems in an emergent digital economy which includes, but stretches well beyond,
crowdfunding.
This fieldwork vignette takes us to the problematic that we address here. Whether
emphasising pioneering crowdfunding platforms or drawing attention to the consolidation of
the platform business model, the conference debate foregrounded multi-sided platforms in the
emergence and expansion of the new digital economy. Yet, this platform-focused interpretation
jars disconcertingly with received understandings of the novel form of digital economic
13Langley and Leyshon
circulation of which crowdfunding is but part. Emerging over the last decade and now apparent
across a number of digital economic ecologies – including social media, online marketplaces,
crowdfunding, crowdsourcing, and the sharing economy more broadly – such circulations carry
ideas, knowledge, labour and use rights for otherwise idle assets between geographically
distributed but connected and interactive online communities. Prevailing explanations cast
digital economic circulations as horizontal, networked exchange relations between users which
are new and different because of their disintermediated, collaborative, and even
democratising qualities. Deploying concepts such as ‘co-production’ (e.g. Prahalad and
Ramaswamy, 2004; Thomke, 2003), ‘prosumption’ (e.g. Ritzer and Jurgensen, 2010),
‘productive publics’ (Arvidsson and Peitersen, 2013), and ‘peer-to-peer’ (Oram, 2001),
established accounts are problematic, in short, because they render platforms largely invisible
in the understandings that they offer of the digital economy.
In this article, by contrast, we want to develop an analysis provoked by ‘platform
capitalism’, a neologism that can be traced to a critique of the sharing economy offered by the
German blogger, Sascha Lobo (2014). Under the rubric of platform capitalism, we aim to place
‘the platform’ at the centre of critical understandings of digital economic circulation. For us,
platform capitalism is a useful signifier for naming an analytical focus on ‘the platform’ which,
following José van Dijck (2013), can be thought of as a discrete and dynamic arrangement
defined by a particular combination of socio-technical and capitalist business practices. Over
time, we would hope that the neologism of platform capitalism will provoke further research
dedicated to detailing how this particular coming together of socio-technical and business
practices manifests itself in concrete terms for specific enterprises. Here, however, we take the
first steps toward centring critical understandings of digital economic circulation on the
platform by opening up key conceptual and analytical concerns. By building on but departing
from van Dijck’s (2013) prescient work on social media platforms, we argue that the
generative force of the platform in digital economic circulation turns, in different ways, on
practices of intermediation and processes of capitalisation.
Although the platforms operating in each domain of digital circulation are somewhat
different – we will offer a typology below – they nonetheless share a distinctive logic and set of
socio-technical practices of intermediation. Integral to framing ‘marketisation’ and, in
particular, to structuring ‘market encounters’ in digital space (Çalişkan and Callon, 2010: 14-
16), platform intermediation is distinctive because it attempts both to make the ‘connections’
of multi-sided markets and to coordinate the network effects of ‘connectivity’ (van Dijck,
2013). The business of intermediating digital circulation is also increasingly the enactment of
a unique platform business model. Performing the structure of the venture capital investment
which also backs it, the platform business model prescribes a novel enterprise form that is
crucial to the valuation and ‘capitalisation’ processes which leverage debt against future
revenue prospects from digital economic circulation (see Doganova and Muniesa, 2015;
Leyshon and Thrift, 2007).
Our intervention differs from previous critical research that, confronting the problematic
understanding of digital economic circulations as networked exchange relations, also relates
the new digital economy to capitalism. We do not contribute here to the debate over the
capitalist/post-capitalist character of digital economic circulation that typically collapses into
‘the users-versus-owners standoff’ (van Dijck, 2013: 18; see, for example, Kostakis and
Bauwens, 2014; Mason, 2015). Nor do we begin by placing the new digital economy in the
context of the apparent contradictions, limits, and transformations of the capitalist mode of
production, or insist that the cutting edge of value creation is based upon the ‘enclosure’ of
‘the commons’ and the exploitation of ‘immaterial’ and ‘affective labour’ (e.g. Boutang, 2012;
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Greene and Joseph, 2015; Hardt and Negri, 2009; Terranova, 2004). For us, such
considerations of property relations and value are folded into an explicit concern with the
practical accomplishment of ‘the platform’ as a distinct mode of socio-technical intermediary
and business arrangement that is incorporated into wider processes of capitalisation. We
acknowledge that, despite the rhetoric around the ‘disruption’ of intensified market
competition, platforms conduct digital turf wars. We will highlight, however, that the ‘winner
takes all’ objective of platforms (Kenney and Zysman, 2016) is grounded in an intermediary
logic and business model that hinges on cornering market-making and the coordination of
network effects in particular niche domains of digital circulation. Similarly, we recognise that
value capture from connectivity by platforms relies upon harnessing the affordances and
fragilities of immaterial labour (Friedman, 2014; Hill, 2015; Leyshon et al., 2016). However, we
want to stress the future-facing processes of valuation and capitalisation (see Helgesson and
Muniesa, 2013; Muniesa, 2012), and we will show how, for the present at least, such
processes are also highly significant to sustaining the platform.
Our method throughout the paper is to interrogate the burgeoning coverage of digital
economy platforms in the media and popular literature, especially the ‘how to’ and ‘secrets of
my success’ guides offered by pioneers who provide personal accounts of their own platform
start-ups (e.g. Chase, 2015; Stephany, 2015). We also engage with the dedicated body of
expert academic-practitioner business knowledge that coalesces around the ex-post
rationalisation of the new digital economy as a ‘platform economy’ (e.g. Choudary, 2015;
Parker et al., 2016; Kenney and Zysman, 2016; Zysman and Kenney, 2014). The following
section elaborates upon the distinctive intermediary logic of the platform, which is to make
multi-sided markets and coordinate network effects, and provides a typology of the domains of
circulation and corresponding platform types that can be categorised under the rubric of
platform capitalism. The third section elucidates the socio-technical practices of platform
intermediation which proceed by enrolling users through a participatory economic culture, and
by mobilising an array of codes and data analytics to construct the infrastructures which are
immanent to digital economic circulation. Section four considers how platform intermediation
is now nested in a business model that targets scale economies and seeks to extract rents
from circulations and associated data trails. The business model is also shown to perform the
structure of venture capital investment funds that capitalise on the potential of platforms to
realise monopoly rents. In conclusion, we highlight the issues of platform capitalism that
require the most urgent attention: the role of platforms in the degradation of work, and the
sustainability of platforms that are now highly valued and heavily capitalised as a
consequence of venture capital investment.
The intermediary logic of the platform
For Sascha Lobo and likeminded critics, the neologism of ‘platform capitalism’ is a necessary
counterweight to a narrative building around the sharing economy which depicts it as diverse
and redistributive, made possible by new kinds of networked exchange. Summarising Lobo’s
position, fellow blogger Sebastian Olma (2014) argues that the platform has emerged as “a
generic ‘ecosystem’ able to link potential customers to anything and anyone, from private
individuals to multinational corporations” (Section 3, Paragraph 1). This means that “[e]very
one can become a supplier for all sorts of products and services at the click of a button”,
which “is the real innovation that companies of the platform capitalism variety have
introduced” (ibid.). Rene Ridgway (2015) broadens this definition when she suggests that, in
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donation and rewards crowdfunding, it is platform capitalism that ‘conditions’ how networks
come together. Meanwhile, Kostakis and Bauwens (2014) suggest that the digital economy is
characterised by a tension between two organisational modes of control over online
infrastructures: first, what they call “distributed capitalism”, in which “infrastructure is
primarily distributed with the promise to make everyone a small capitalist” (p. 71), and second,
what they call “netarchical capitalism”, where infrastructure is “in the hands of centralized
privately owned platforms” (p. 71). These various observations about platform capitalism all
point towards the intermediary logic of the connective ecologies and infrastructures of the
platform.
The underlying intermediary logic of the platform is that it solves coordination problems in
market exchange by extending the distance-shrinking networking capacities of the internet first
identified during the 1990s (e.g. Evans and Wurster, 1999; Liebowitz, 2002). In particular, the
advent of the internet created new opportunities to solve the problem of two-sided or multi-
sided markets, where economic agents need to find each other to transact. Evans (2011)
provides four exemplars of intermediation within two- or multi-sided markets. A traditional
example is a physical place-based exchange, like a stock or commodities exchange, which
hosts buyers and sellers (for a fee). Other exemplars include advertising-supported media,
which provide content of various kinds to attract audiences that are delivered to advertisers
(who are charged for access); and transaction systems such as credit and debit cards, that act
as a form of payment between buyer and vendor (with an interchange fee charged to vendors).
Evans’ fourth exemplar – software platforms – explains in part why the intermediation of multi-
sided exchange in digital space is increasingly regarded as the preserve of the platform. Here
code, in the form of an operating system, becomes the medium for connecting disparate
actors (for example, through its Windows platform, Microsoft co-ordinates a three-sided market
that connects computer users, applications developers and hardware manufacturers). In
contrast, Microsoft’s main rival, Apple, runs a two-sided market which connects users and
application developers through its iOS platform, but maintains a monopoly over the
manufacture of its hardware. The smartphone industry similarly divides into two-sided (e.g.
Apple iPhone) and multi-sided platforms (e.g. Google Android), while in the computer game
industry two-sided console platforms (e.g. Sony Playstation, Nintendo, Microsoft, Sega) match
game developers with users.4
Emerging from these software-based industries and refracted through neo-classical
assumptions about market exchange, platform intermediation has rapidly expanded since the
mid-2000s to encompass a wider set of multi-sided markets. Table 1 below provides a
typology of the primary domains and platform types that can be categorised as comprising the
new digital economic circulations of platform capitalism, and identifies examples of the main
platforms that we have in our analytical sights. What our typology recognises, moreover, is that
the intermediary logic shared by all platform types is distinctive in crucial respects: it goes
beyond the making of multi-sided markets through software code to also include the creation
and coordination of network effects. Platform intermediation thus frames the “market
encounters” of marketisation processes in ways that are significantly different to the typical
mediation of market exchange (Çalişkan and Callon, 2010: 14-16). What is distinctive is not so
much the role of the platform as a “non-human mediator” of market encounters that mobilises
the distance-shrinking network powers of the internet (Çalişkan and Callon, 2010: 15), but
that platform intermediation targets the ostensible opportunities offered by network effects
and the so-called ‘co-creation’ of value between users. In van Dijck’s (2013) succinct terms,
platforms are not simply in the business of intermediating connections, but of actively curating
connectivity.
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Table 1. Platform capitalism: Domains of circulation and platform types. Source: Authors' own.
An appreciation of the distinct intermediary logic of the platform thus leads us to include social
media within our typology, as one of the most prominent domains of the new form of digital
economic circulation. This is because, since the mid-2000s in particular, the type of platform
operating in this field has been at the forefront of the intermediation of networked
connectivity, relying on the input and creativity of their interactive users – from posting
updates to uploading new content – in order to generate audiences that can be sold to
advertisers as consumers (van Dijck, 2013; Mangold and Faulds, 2009). Indeed, social media
platforms have been particularly successful at not only attracting large audiences but, by
subjecting their data to close analytical scrutiny, offering advertisers and their clients more
forensic and targeted consumer marketing campaigns.
It is the distinctive intermediary platform logic that also leads us to exclude from our
typology those websites that attract consumers through aggregator interfaces which provide
price-based comparisons (e.g. Money Supermarket), or user-generated reviews (e.g. Trip
Advisor). Price-comparison and review-based websites are fee-earning digital economy
intermediaries but, unlike platforms, they do not seek to facilitate and capture value from the
interactions and circulations of Web 2.0. Our demarcation of domains of circulation and
platform types also excludes what might be described as ‘mainstream’ e-commerce which
arrived with much fanfare during the ‘new economy’ or ‘dot-com’ boom of the late 1990s
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(Feng et al., 2001; Thrift, 2001; Zook, 2005). There are important continuities from e-
commerce into platform capitalism, including an intermediary logic, the catalytic role of
venture capital in funding new start-ups, and the urgent need to quickly ‘scale-up’ operations
to make a business viable (see below and, for e-commerce, Daniels, et al., 2007). But, for the
most part, the web sites and mobile apps of e-commerce typically intermediate exchange in
two-sided markets – either business-to-consumer (B2C) or business-to-business (B2B) – and
provide an additional ‘channel’ (alongside ‘bricks and mortar’ retail outlets and telesales)
through which established firms market their products and services.
Digital economies are highly dynamic, however, and some e-commerce firms have
extended their operations to become platforms that intermediate network effects. In order to
do so, a critical decision for e-commerce firms is whether to open up their application program
interface (API), which specifies how software components in its systems should interact. Firms
that have open APIs enable software developers to build applications that can be added to the
platform. This model of interaction was successfully developed in the open source software
community of the 1990s (von Hippel, 2005; Weber, 2004), and is a way of fast-tracking
innovation by drawing on a distributed community of knowledge. The incentive for developers
is to write applications that are attractive to users, and that might generate extra revenue for
platforms for which developers are rewarded with commissions. For example, it was the
adoption of this approach that, following the dot-com boom, gradually transformed Amazon
from an e-commerce retailer that mainly challenged incumbent bookshops into a platform-
intermediated, wide-spectrum online marketplace (Simon, 2011). By opening up its API, a
host of new applications and revenue streams were attached to the platform. For example,
individuals with their own web sites were encouraged to become Amazon associates, taking
commission when users are directed to Amazon to make a purchase. It also developed a multi-
sided marketplace where both individuals and retailers can offer their own products for sale,
with Amazon taking a commission on all sales.
Participatory culture and infrastructural intermediation
The distinctive intermediary logic of the platform materialises through a particular
configuration of socio-technical practices. For one of the leading gurus of the platform
economy, Paul Choudary (2015: loc 868), for example, platform intermediation combines
three distinct operational “layers” which will vary in “thickness” and importance according to
market context and competitive strategy. These layers are: first, a network or community layer,
which consists of platform participants and the relationships between them; second, an
infrastructure layer, which is made up of software tools, rules and services; and third, a data
layer, which allows the platform to attempt to match supply with demand. The webpages and
marketing pitches of platforms are crucial to the first of these ‘layers’, and typically produce a
participatory economic culture that plays to the broader and deeper cultural rhetoric about the
inclusive and democratising qualities of the internet (van Dijck, 2013: 9-10). To a greater-or-
lesser extent, different platform types attempt to enrol participants who are figured not as
‘consumers’ but as ‘users’ who ‘co-create value’. In Choudary’s (2015: 43) terms, “platforms
must invest in behavior design”, eliciting “new behaviors that had never existed in the past”
and ensuring that “users stick around of their own accord” (emphasis in original). Put
differently, and in the more critical terms of Lovink and Tkacz (2015: 14), the intermediation of
networked economic connectivity features the summoning-up of the popular passions and
interests of what they call the “platformed masses”.
18 Finance and Society 3(1)
For UK equity crowdfunding platforms, for example, what they offer is a prospect that is
explicitly entrepreneurial – “a chance to be part of the next big thing”, a “revolutionary
opportunity” which “enables anyone to invest in British businesses alongside professional
investors and VCs” (venture capitalists).5 Reward and donation modes of crowdfunding will not
typically involve venture capitalists or invoke venture capitalism. Nonetheless, the funding
campaigns run by various kinds of artists or innovation-based companies attempt to draw
those who donate money into the entrepreneurial trajectories of their projects, both by
providing regular updates on progress (often by vlogs and ‘microfilms’ in ways that mimic other
social media platforms) and by offering early access to the product, service or creative output.
Meanwhile, sharing economy platforms like Uber and Airbnb offer users the prospect of
gaining access to services – taxis, short-term rented accommodation, and so on – that are
generally cheaper and possess different qualities and features to those offered by traditional
providers. Users enrolled in the sharing economy thus appear as a networked consumer-
entrepreneur, a kind of digital amalgam of the canny consumer of exchange markets and the
entrepreneurial owner of an asset portfolio. In particular, sharing economy platforms promise
a “seemingly flatter and more participatory model, whereby customers engage directly with
each other” (Morozov, 2015: n.p.), an appeal to ostensible disintermediation that is also found
on the webpages of platforms that specialise in the P2P lending mode of crowdfunding.
Moreover, thanks to the always-on and mobile connectivity provided by smartphones, it seems
that users in the sharing economy “can suddenly do things that previously required an array of
institutions” (ibid.). Buyers and sellers also meet as ostensible near equivalents in such
transactions; whereas in the past such exchanges were characterised by information
asymmetries, platforms such as Uber and Airbnb provide information on the reputation of
buyers and sellers that can inform both sides in deciding whether an exchange should take
place.
Tarleton Gillespie’s (2010) account of the diverse etymological origins of the term
‘platform’ provides for a particularly insightful vantage point from which to consider their
positioning as enablers of the ‘co-creation of value’. They are “platforms of opportunity” which
are ostensibly “flat, featureless and open to all”, and capable of “lifting us all up, evenly”
(Gillespie, 2010: 347, 350, 352). Gillespie finds the origins of ‘platform’ to be simultaneously
computational (as in a software code, discussed above), architectural (as in a raised surface),
figurative (as a grounding for an action), and political (as in a political position or base). The
conflation of these different meanings results in what Gillespie calls a “discursive positioning”
of the platform which brings together:
… terms and ideas that are specific enough to mean something, and vague enough to work across multiple
venues for multiple audiences. To call one’s online service a platform is not a meaningless claim, nor is it a
simple one. (Gillespie, 2010: 349)
The use of the term platform has computational and coding roots, but the other architectural,
figurative, and political understandings are bundled in and create “broad connotations” that
platforms are “open, neutral, egalitarian and progressive” (p. 352). This appeal to openness
and participation means “it should come as no surprise … that the term would … gain traction
around user-generated content, streaming media, blogging and social computing” (p. 351).
And, we would add, it is equally no surprise that the category of ‘platform’ has largely replaced
‘domain’ and become ubiquitous across digital economic spaces that are typically held to be
marked by the creative and collaborative character of networked exchange.
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While the presentation and marketing of platforms positions them as the enablers of a
participatory digital economic culture amongst users, the ‘how to’ and ‘secrets of my success’
guides offered by the pioneers of platform start-ups tell a different story that begins to
highlight the other principal ‘layers’ of this discrete mode of socio-technical intermediary
practice. For ZipCar co-founder Robin Chase (2015: 18), for example, the emergence of the
sharing economy – or what she terms Peers Inc – is broadened out into “a revolution … taking
place inside capitalism as we reimagine the role of consumers, producers, and even
ownership”. And, as digital economic networks become the “new paradigm” to replace
“industrial capitalism”’ (pp. 18-19), the role of platforms (or ‘the Inc.’) is cast as crucial:
It is the Inc. that has the ability to make long-term and large investments, marshal teams with many kinds
of expertise, extract economies of scale, and apply standard forms of interaction and quality. The unique
role of the Inc. is to do what peers cannot – to create platforms for participation and to put the assets …
into the hands of the smaller, autonomous peers who participate. (Chase, 2015: 36-7)
What Chase argues, in effect, is that as they seek to facilitate the creative energies of network
economicus, platforms are indispensable because they are the network.
As sociological and geographical research into Web 2.0 culture underscores, networked
associations and interactions are necessarily dependent upon software code which must
continuously operate to produce digital spaces (Kitchin and Dodge, 2011), not to mention the
physical hardware of computers, tablets, and mobile devices and labyrinths of fibre optic
cables, wireless networks, cloudservers, and so on (Kinsley, 2014). It follows that digital
economic circulations are not merely everyday encounters enabled with and between software
(Thrift, 2005), but are actually constituted through and by what can be accordingly conceived
of in various socio-technical and material terms as ‘infrastructures’ (Beer, 2013),
‘architectures’ (Collins, 2010) and ‘ecosystems’ (van Dijck, 2013). The constant running of the
partially concealed software code and applications of platforms are, to borrow from David Beer
(2013), the ‘infrastructures of participation’ in the digital economy.
The platform can be said, then, to mobilise the infrastructures of participation that are
immanent to the new digital economic circulation. Digital economic circulation is afforded
through platforms that undertake coding based on data and metadata; deploy algorithms for
processing relations between data points; use protocols to script interactions; and configure
interfaces which are both visible features (e.g. buttons, scroll bars) and defaults, as well as the
invisible links between data, software and hardware (open or closed to application
programming) (van Dijck, 2013: 29-32). Contrary to the meanings that might be implied by the
metaphor of ‘infrastructure’, however, platforms are not utilities or conduits that simply
channel circulations. Platforms actively induce, produce and programme circulations. As Beer
(2013) notes in relation to the infrastructures of Web 2.0, platforms realise and act upon data
(through archiving and algorithms, for example) in ways that feed-back, structure, delimit and
even determine the circulations of popular culture.
For us, the neologism of ‘platform capitalism’ foregrounds the holding together of the
infrastructural and intermediary qualities of the platform. Platforms are particular comings
together of code and commerce: when infrastructures of participation and connectivity are
designed and data is realised and acted upon, this is the intermediation of digital economic
circulation in action. As van Dijck (2013) puts it when she ‘disassembles’ the principal social
media platforms, platforms are, at once, techno-cultural constructs and socioeconomic
structures. Acting to make market networks as what we might call infrastructural
intermediaries, platforms necessarily ‘standardise’ the circulations in which they specialise,
whether these be ideas, knowledge, labour, or use rights for otherwise idle assets (see
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Çalişkan and Callon, 2010: 7-8). While this involves legal and contractual devices, it is also a
matter of conventions of inclusion/exclusion and differentiation through categorisation. For
example, in the sharing economy, both Uber and Lyft require their independently contracted
drivers to undergo background checks in order to inculcate trust among passengers using the
service. Airbnb, meanwhile, deploys categories for room type, amenities, and charges to
enable users to connect with the assets that best suit their needs, whims, and wallets. Due
diligence is deployed by equity crowdfunding platforms to screen out projects on grounds of
their integrity and feasibility. Similarly, Funding Circle, a leading P2P lending platform in the
UK, demarcates the business loans that it offers to would-be investors according to its own
risk-weighted categories ranked A+ to E (Langley, 2016). Such standardisations,
inclusions/exclusions, and differentiations are especially significant to stabilising participants’
expectations, and are the underpinnings of pricing processes that platforms also programme
and organise.
The infrastructural intermediation of digital economic circulation also features a further
device that is especially significant to making multi-sided markets and coordinating network
effects; namely, the judgment and evaluation systems of platforms that solicit user reviews
and rankings, often by counter-parties (e.g. Uber drivers and riders can rate each other, as can
Airbnb’s hosts and guests). As Morozov (2015) observes, for some free-market enthusiasts,
reputational devices contribute to making the sharing economy a near perfect market, where
participants have access to almost fully disclosed information on the other parties: “if you are
a nasty customer or an ill-mannered driver, everybody else will soon discover this, and specific
laws to police your behaviour are rendered unnecessary” (n.p.). In popular parlance,
punishment by the crowd takes the form of ‘public shaming’ (Ronson, 2015). For Arvidsson
and Peitersen (2013: xvi-xvii), meanwhile, digital economies become “reputation economies”,
where “reputation functions as a kind of capital” and measure of value for participants that,
“at an abstract level”, “could constitute the foundation for the institutional architecture of an
ethical economy (much like the institutions of industrial capitalism were based on the idea of
value derived from labor time)”.6 Leaving aside Arvidsson and Peitersen’s broader claims,
what is important is how platforms build ostensibly stabilising reputation economies into the
infrastructures of digital economic circulation. Ideas, knowledge, labour and use rights for
otherwise idle assets in circulation are thus qualified in a manner that appears thoroughly
consistent with the figurative positioning of the platform as an enabler of participatory
economic culture.
The platform business model and venture capital
The intermediary logic and socio-technical practices of the platform have developed somewhat
fitfully. As van Dijck observes of social media platforms from the late-1990s and early-2000s,
… most Web 2.0 platforms started out as indeterminate services for the exchange of communicative or
creative content among friends. These services also emanated from community-bound initiatives – a group
of college students, photo aficionados, video enthusiasts – who adopted a specific niche of online
interaction and developed a mediated routine practice. (van Dijck, 2013: 6)
Given this indeterminacy – and although there are notable exceptions, such as Amazon – it is
of little surprise that platforms have been slow to translate the logic and socio-technical
practice of intermediation into a viable business strategy (Lacy, 2008). However, an emergent
business model is now providing an ex post rationalisation of the platform as enterprise and,
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in effect, of a decade or so of investment by venture capital funds and other institutions that
has backed ‘the rise of the platform economy’ (Kenney and Zysman, 2016).
Expressed through a burgeoning body of consultancy knowledge and the ‘how to’ and
‘secrets of my success’ guides of early platform pioneers, the business model is crucial to a
platform-centred understanding of digital economic circulation in two principal respects. First,
and most obviously, it inscribes strategic business logics and meanings on the contingent
developments and innovative ‘tinkering’ of platform intermediation (see Mokyr, 2002).
Contemporary platforms now enact experiments across the various domains of circulation
outlined in the first main section of this article but, according to the business model, the
success of all platform types turns, in the first instance, on significant investment in the
technology and know-how necessary for the design and operation of an infrastructure which
has to ‘scale’ as a matter of priority (i.e. rapidly and consistently add users). In this respect,
there are clear parallels between the platform business model and B2C and B2B e-commerce
business models. Whereas e-commerce firms sought to quickly establish and protect their
shares of new online marketplaces, for a platform to scale requires the delineation and
domination of a multi-sided market network niche. In Bonchek and Choudary’s (2013) terms,
for example, it is ‘connection’, ‘attraction’ and ‘flow’ that determine the success or otherwise
of a platform’s scaling strategy. Connection, which refers to the ease by which others can
connect to the platform ‘to share and transact’, will for some platforms mean making its API
freely available, while for others it will be the ease with which users can add and store content
or exchange, share, borrow, invest, and so on. The more straightforward the process of
connection, the more attraction the platform will generate as a market network for users.
Finally, connection and attraction ensure that the ‘co-creation of value’ between users will flow
through the platform. This process has also been described as a ‘flywheel’ that, when in
motion, seems to gather its own momentum to generate direct and indirect network effects
(Evans and Gawer, 2016). For instance, when YouTube became rapidly established during the
latter half of 2005 as the go-to video content-hosting platform, it quickly outstripped Google
Video which was launched contemporaneously. YouTube featured an interface that was
extremely popular with users because digital content could be uploaded in almost any format,
whereas Google Vision required potential users to first download software that would
standardise the format of their uploads. The ease and flexibility of the act of uploading
ensured that the YouTube platform filled up with content, which in turn attracted audiences,
and then advertisers. Google purchased YouTube in October 2006 at a cost of $1.65 billion
(BBC News Online, 2006).
Enacting experiments with a platform business model that targets up-scaling has become
progressively easier over time. As the earlier example of White Label Crowdfunding highlighted,
infrastructural investment no longer has to be largely in-house, but can be purchased ‘off-the-
shelf’ from specialist providers and software companies. Core competencies and labour
requirements can also now be accessed more easily. For instance, crowdsourcing platforms
such as Skillshare allow ‘everyday creators’ to become ‘teachers’ who offer ‘classes’ in the
form of short films or vlogs. Such classes cover a wide range of business, design, and
technology matters that are relevant to building a platform enterprise, and are made available
for a subscription fee which is shared between Skillshare and the ‘teacher’.7
Moreover, while levels of investment clearly vary across platform types and the specific
expansionary plans of particular platforms – Amazon, for example, spends an immense
amount of money investing in its logistical and computational capacities – the platform
business model holds that the marginal cost of up-scaling a platform is relatively trivial,
especially when compared with the kind of investment in vertical integration, resources, and
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intellectual property that is necessary to produce economies of scale in both ‘old’ and ‘new
economies’. For Chase (2015: 73-5), for example, the growth potential of platforms can “defy
the laws of physics” because expansion is based on the “unlocking” and “leveraging” of the
co-creation of value by networked peers. Framed and produced by the distinct intermediary
logic of platforms, assets, knowledge, and labour in circulation are non-proprietary and
decentralised, but they are nonetheless amenable to aggregation and exploitation. As
Choudary (2015: 38) succinctly summarises, “the network effect is the new driver for scale”. It
appears that the key for the platform is to intermediate the ever-expanding value created by
user interactions across their market network. This is because continually increasing numbers
of users – understood as producers and creators of value and generators of data, and not as
consumers – is crucial to a platform’s capacity to cultivate and capture value, and to do so
over time and on an ever-greater scale.
The business model is also crucial to a platform-centred understanding of digital
economic circulation in a second and further respect: the model provides for a relatively
coherent and powerful framing of the valuation and capitalisation of the platform. As Fabian
Muniesa (2016) points out, since the first decades of the twentieth-century, processes of
business valuation have increasingly come to measure a business as “an asset”, wherein
“what a business is worth equals its capacity to generate a stream of revenues for the investor
or investors that provide it with funding” (p. 196). Emerging from management schools during
the 1970s and growing in popularity since the 1990s, business models further such valuation
processes because they extol and specify the “asset-becoming” prospects of a form of
enterprise that is new or different in one way or another (Doganova and Muniesa, 2015: 120).
As it valorises the platform as capitalist business arrangement, then, the platform model is a
proposition that more-or-less precisely articulates for investors how particular platform-assets
“will yield income that can both act as collateral and as sources of proﬁt in their own right”
(Leyshon and Thrift, 2007: 100). The platform thus becomes a legitimate object of
capitalisation, that is, an enterprise that is able to access debt from investors because its
revenue prospects suggest that it can realise a return on capital.
According to the platform business model, achieving scale and coordinating network
effects opens out into the enactment of two principal and somewhat overlapping “revenue
models” (Chase, 2015: 121). The first is the preserve of ‘constrained’ or ‘closed’ platform
types which typically operate in the sharing economy and the various crowdfunding ecologies.
The infrastructures of these platforms facilitate “relatively uniform collaboration (and products
and services)” (p. 105), and users are required by the platform to pay fees or charges. In this
regard, as noted above, infrastructures feature the coding and design of effective user
interfaces and webpage layouts that do not merely list goods, services, assets, work
opportunities and the like, but which structure particular standardisations, qualifications and
categorisations that can multiply transactions and the fees earned on those transactions.
The second revenue model is more diverse and dynamic in nature. It does not feature
intermediary fees or charges, and is summarised in critical terms by Lovink and Tkacz (2015:
15) as the “service/data-profile/advertising complex”. For Chase (2015), the second approach
to revenue generation is the most significant for relatively ‘unconstrained’ platform types,
especially social media platforms and those that intermediate online market exchange with
open APIs. Some user-generated platforms initially sought to develop subscription revenues,
but a number of related revenue streams have become particularly significant as data
analytics have improved. By combining data analysis with automated customisation
techniques, platforms earn revenues from targeted advertisements and recommendations
appearing as banners or running in sidebars. Facebook, for instance, generates its largest
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revenue stream by delivering its users to advertisers (Zysman and Kenney, 2014). Google,
meanwhile, earned $47 billion in 2015 from an advertising market for internet search
platforms that alone is worth $86 billion in total (Gallagher, 2016). And, for the Google-owned
YouTube platform, the generation of advertising revenues is accelerated by the promotion of a
new strata of social media celebrities who produce digital video content that can attract
millions of followers. Moreover, as some commentators suggest (e.g. Foster, 2014; Zuboff,
2016), the harvesting and analysis of aggregated real-time data on the activities and
movements of platform users may be in the process of becoming the primary source of
revenue across the platform business model.
Understood in more critical terms, the revenues prescribed by the platform business
model amount to the extraction of ‘rent’ from circulations and associated data trails. As
Lazzarato (2015) argues, ‘rent’ can be understood as an ‘apparatus’ that is distinct from profit
and taxation, and which combines constitutive knowledge processes of valorisation with a
mode of appropriating value from property that has been long emphasised by Marxist political
economists (e.g. Harvey, 1976). Re-thought in such terms, the enactment of the recently
articulated platform business model has the effect of positioning platform intermediaries as
the “‘rentiers’ of the network” (O’Dwyer, 2015: 234). The first platform revenue model – sitting
comfortably with well-established intermediary practices that also accumulate fees and
charges (e.g. in the financial sector, see Christophers, 2015) – is 'direct rent'; platforms
intermediate by extracting rent (charging vendors, borrowers, those with assets to share, etc.)
for transacting via their infrastructures. For the second revenue stream, meanwhile, rent
extraction is 'indirect', and sits much less comfortably with revenues derived from land and
other property. The extraction of rent via automated targeted advertising and data harvesting
and analytics is “a payment in attention, information, or affiliation, which in turn can be sold to
advertising companies and market researchers who require access to users, their content, and
their networks” (O’Dwyer, 2015: 234-35). Both direct and indirect rent are rationalised and
justified by a business model that – stressing the know-how, skills, and investment necessary
to building a successful platform – extols the benefits of up-scaled networks for all users.
Furthermore, what is also especially notable about the platform business model is that it
performs the structure of the venture capital funds that are the major source of investment in
platforms. The most established platforms that survived and evolved out of the bursting of the
dot-com bubble are now fully integrated into the mainstream, corporate landscape of the US
stock market: Apple and Facebook, for example, are in the top 10 (by index market
capitalisation weight) of the S&P 500, the leading US equity index.8 Younger platforms have
also recently achieved stock market listings: in September 2014, for instance, the Chinese
platform intermediary, Alibaba, achieved a $25 billion Initial Public Offering (IPO) in the US that
was the largest ever by valuation (Chen et al., 2014). Indeed, Evans and Gawer (2016: 10)
argue that by 2015 there were as many as 176 platform companies with a market
capitalisation of at least $1 billion. But, across the domains of digital economic circulation
where US-based platforms feature strongly and continue to set the pace, many platforms
remain privately owned, largely by San Francisco Bay-based venture capital funds, private
equity and other similar institutions.9 This has been made possible in recent years by
increasing volumes of capital being channelled into venture capital funds that, at the same
time, have directed their attention to platforms and other software firms. For example, $58.8
billion of investments flowed through US venture capital funds in 2015, the second highest
annual total since 1995 (i.e. the beginning of the new economy boom). And, in terms of
distribution, investment flowed disproportionately into the software sector, over and above the
biotechnology and media and entertainment sectors (NVCA, 2016).
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The performance of the structure of venture capital funds by the platform business model
reflects the prevalence of the knowledge and valuations of venture capital firms in
technological innovation by new enterprises. As Matthew Zook (2005: 52) shows, since the
1960s, venture capitalists have established a powerful position as both investors and
“knowledge brokers” in cutting-edge technology firms. However, the platform business model
does not perform a set script on digital innovation prescribed by venture capitalists. Indeed,
the various ‘how to’ texts which outline the platform business model tend to pay only very
limited attention to raising finance and attracting investors (see Chase, 2015). In this instance,
the performative power of venture capital is better seen as an example of what Clarke (2012)
classifies as ‘generic performativity’, wherein the platform business model continuously
performs the common structural categories (not a specific theory) of venture capital funds in
two main ways.
First, the platform business model performs the temporal structure of venture capital
funds. Funds are typically 10-year fixed-term independent partnerships composed of so-called
‘limited partners’; that is, those who invest in the fund, including wealthy individuals and
institutional investors (pension funds, insurance companies, endowments, banks and cash-
rich corporations). Funds are managed by ‘general partners’ who receive annual fees of 2-3%
of a fund’s value, plus a 20-30% share of eventual returns. Each fund’s portfolio will be
assembled during its opening three years or so, as managers identify the start-ups they wish
to support and hold back a portion of capital for subsequent rounds of investment to be
triggered by agreed milestones (Mason, 2009). For a fund to achieve aggregate returns, the
equity stakes in the start-ups that form the portfolio must be cashed-out within its 10-year
term, although the target for such ‘liquidity events’ is usually three to five years. However, in
order for liquidity events to take place – either via an IPO, acquisition, or sale of shares to
another investor – start-ups are typically expected to have begun to demonstrate their capacity
for revenue growth and thus cost-recovery to investors, an expectation that was largely
suspended for the wave of tech company IPOs which characterised the dot-com boom (Feng et
al., 2001). In terms of their temporal structure, then, venture capital funds are performed by
the platform business model precisely because it elaborates upon the streams of revenue that
can be realised by platforms which rapidly up-scale. To borrow from Feng et al.’s (2001: 501)
account of the dot-com boom, the platform business model specifies the “variable form of the
relation between [venture capital-backed] innovation and cost-recovery [for investors] in
present-day capitalism”. As the business model makes rent extraction appear viable for
platform intermediaries that quickly scale, so it performs the growth trajectory of start-up firms
that is valorised by venture capital and which culminates in liquidity events.
Second, the platform business model also performs the portfolio structure of venture
capital funds. Venture capital funds operate a high risk/high reward investment strategy. When
capitalising on unproven start-up firms with a rapid growth potential in return for equity stakes,
fund portfolios are expected to contain only a minority of investments that will ultimately pay-
off. This is encapsulated in the so-called ‘2:6:2 rule’ governing venture capital funds: two
investments will be losses, six will break-even, and only two will realise returns, but these
‘home runs’ will be of such an order of magnitude that the overall portfolio will generate
returns that outperform equity markets over the same period (Mason, 2009). Thus, the
parameters of venture capital fund portfolio structure are performed by a platform business
model that explicitly coordinates network effects to generate revenues. The result, in our
terms, are processes of valuation and capitalisation in which a platform’s attempts to extract
rents from digital economic circulations conform to the oligopolistic and even monopolistic
tendencies of platform intermediation: platforms target dominance of their own niche market
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infrastructure, at the expense of others who are therefore destined to ‘fail’. Platforms seek to
extract rents from their network which are, in essence, monopoly rents.
Failure for start-ups in this context needs be qualified, however, as success for venture
capital may not only equate with achieving an IPO. Consider, for example, how publicly-quoted
platforms seek to defend their dominant market share and expand in new directions by buying
up smaller rivals, and how additional rounds of investment in privately-owned platforms is
often for the dedicated purpose of strengthening their market position, such that platforms
targeting monopoly rents are currently a very strong presence amongst so-called ‘unicorns’
(privately-owned firms valued at over $1 billion) (Kenney and Zysman, 2016). For instance,
following the 2005 purchase of YouTube noted above, publicly-quoted Google has since made
in excess of fifteen acquisitions of firms that variously specialised in advertising technologies
and interfaces, email security, video compression, and mobile phone platforms (see Rosoff,
2011). Thus, if platform start-ups achieve sufficient prominence and promise and are bought
out by a more dominant platform seeking or defending a monopoly position, then this equates
to a viable and successful strategy: it does not result in an IPO, but nonetheless performs the
temporal structure of venture capital funds because it permits investors to cash out.
Concluding remarks
By singling-out the digital economic circulations of platform capitalism for attention, we do not
wish to downplay the significance of e-commerce platforms, cloud computing, and software
code more broadly in the organisation of contemporary socio-economic life (Thrift, 2005;
Amoore, 2016). Such digital technologies can be said, for example, to be contributing to a
transformation of both the processes and end products of manufacturing enterprises (Zysman
and Kenney, 2014). Rather, by invoking the rubric of platform capitalism, our purpose in this
article has been to draw critical attention to a novel form of digital economic circulation, and to
a typically overlooked feature of this new ‘new economy’ that is hiding in plain sight: the
platform.
When placing the platform at the centre of critical understandings of digital economic
circulation, moreover, we have suggested that the platform is not merely a manifestation of
wider transformations in the relations and structures of contemporary capitalism. For us,
analytical attention should be given to the contingent configuration and consequences of the
platform as a discrete mode of socio-technical intermediary and capitalist business
arrangement. This led us to stress both the distinctive marketising intermediation of digital
economic circulation by platforms, and the incorporation of platform-intermediated circulation
into wider processes of capitalisation. To make multi-sided markets and coordinate network
effects, platforms enrol users through a participatory economic culture and mobilise code and
data analytics to compose immanent infrastructures. And, nested in an emergent platform
business model that also performs the structure of venture capital fund investment and
valorises potential for monopoly rents, platforms prioritise up-scaling and the direct and/or
indirect extraction of rent from circulations and accompanying data trails.
Given that the platform is likely to become a durable feature of the global economic
landscape for some time to come, we close by highlighting two features of platform capitalism
that require more immediate attention. First, platforms have been subject to considerable
critical comment for their perceived role in degrading conditions of work. For Friedman (2014),
for example, platforms usher in a ‘gig economy’ which has been a feature of employment
growth in the US economy since 2001, and is dominated by short-term or casual contacts.
While this could be argued to be advantageous for those with highly valued skills and
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competencies – such as, for example, software developers who are able to write code to
create applications for platforms – it remains the case that, for many, what Calloway (2016)
dubs ‘apploitation’ is precarious employment at best, and is certainly not accompanied by the
kinds of benefits (e.g. health insurance, pensions) which normally accompany permanent
employment. Thus, crowdsourcing platforms like TaskRabbit and Handy enable people to bid
for often-mundane jobs that the better remunerated do not have either the time or inclination
to undertake for themselves. And, when bidding for work via platforms, individuals may find
themselves in a race to the bottom and, if successful, will do so as self-employed contractors.
The degradation of conditions of work that may accompany the rise of the platform is
perhaps best illustrated by the rise of the sharing economy platform Uber, which describes
itself as a ‘transport connection company’ that unites ‘riders’ with (self-employed) ‘drivers’. As
an intermediary, Uber takes its cut from the fares earned by drivers. Uber’s appearance in the
taxi markets of cities has mainly been met with hostility from incumbent, licensed taxi
companies who are subject to city-based regulations designed to calibrate demand with driver
numbers and to protect health and safety. Uber’s approach to these regulations is typically to
ignore all but those regulations that render specific activities illegal (McNeill, 2016), thereby
increasing supply, threatening the livelihoods of career taxi drivers, and provoking protests and
industrial action (Topham, 2016). However, for those previously excluded from licensed taxi
driving on the basis of race or class (Chassany, 2016), the disruptive capacity of Uber may
create employment opportunities that might not have previously existed.
Second, attention needs to be given most urgently to the ways in which, by performing the
temporal and portfolio structure of venture capital funds, the platform business model has
become closely implicated in the present cycle of the venture capital industry. As Feng et al.
(2001: 498) argue, in “macro-economic terms”, “venture capital is not a system” composed of
separate investment funds, “but a cycle”. After the best part of a decade in which aggregate
venture capital disbursements in platform businesses has increased and accelerated, the
platform business model is pivotal to the outcome of the current cycle of venture capital
investment.
In mid-April 2016, for example, a lead story in The Wall Street Journal reported that, in
the first quarter of the year, the major venture capital firms such as Accel Partners and
Founders Fund had attracted £13 billion worth of investments from pension funds and
endowments into new funds, the largest quarterly total since the height of the dot-com boom
in 2000 (Winkler, 2016). While a portion of this investment is flowing to new start-ups, the
article holds that growth is symptomatic of the willingness of venture capitalists and other
private investors to continue to write ‘bigger checks’ in further rounds of funding for existing
companies which are encouraged ‘to spend to battle for market supremacy’. It also suggests,
moreover, that the cause of the ballooning investment requirements of unicorns and other
privately-owned ‘tech start-ups’ is their ‘burn rate’ – i.e., their investment costs are much
greater than present revenues. For such firms, this also makes an IPO unlikely, as there is little
sign that stock market investors are willing to suspend their scrutiny of revenue growth and
cost-recovery, as was the case during the wave of dot-com IPOs at the turn of the millennium.
Indeed, in the first quarter of 2016, there were no tech-firm IPOs in the US – the first time that
this has been the case during a four-month period since the depths of the global financial
crisis in 2009 (Farrell, 2016).
With an increasing volume of venture capital being staked on the prospect that a limited
number of platforms will eventually be ‘home runs’ – producing the monopolistic, oligopolistic,
and oligopsonist market outcomes that are necessary for user and revenue growth and thus
cost recovery for investors – it also becomes increasingly unlikely that the failures and
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bankruptcies of platforms will simply produce a ‘correction’ to present market optimism. As
concerns emerge about the valuation of specific privately-owned platforms – Uber, for
example, was valued at a staggering $50 billion for a round of capitalisation in July 2015,
despite recorded annual revenues in 2014 of just $400 million (MacMillan and Demos, 2015)
– they encourage doubts and anxieties about the sustainability of the platform business model
in general and its capacity to deliver revenues and returns on investment. There are concerns,
for example, that the proliferation of heavily capitalised platforms which are all seeking to
monopolise market niches is undermining both the willingness of firms to provide
unconstrained platforms with advertising income and the extant strategies of fee-earning
constrained platforms (Morozov, 2016). Not only is the business proposition of unconstrained
platforms troubled – it is based on the capitalisation of revenues from the collection, analysis
and sale of data to advertisers – but a round of destructive competition amongst constrained
platforms becomes necessary to their prospects for revenue growth. What needs to be
subjected to further and urgent scrutiny, then, is whether investors and fund managers will
continue to write ‘bigger checks’ for platforms with high ‘burn rates’ and thereby continue to
sustain the present landscape of platform capitalism.
Notes
1. <http://www.ukcfa.org.uk/members/>
2. <http://p2pfa.info/p2pfa-members/>
3. <http://www.whitelabelcrowd.fund/>
4. The computer game industry has generated its own field of research described as ‘platform
studies’ (Apperley and Parikka, 2015). While this may hold useful pointers for subsequent studies
of platform capitalism, it is not our focus here.
5. See, respectively, <https://www.seedrs.com/invest/why_invest_in_startups#invest/>, and
<http://www.crowdcube.com/pg/investing-your-money-1513/>.
6. See, for example, the discussion on this subject in The Economist’s Free Exchange blog:
<http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21705831-new-technologies-will-
make-society-richer-cultivating-trust-believing-seeing/>.
7. <https://www.skillshare.com/teach?via=homepage/>
8. <http://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-500/>
9. On the global significance of US venture capital funds and their concentration in the San Francisco
Bay area, see Evans and Gawer (2016), Zook (2005) and McNeill (2016).
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